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The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing
by Married Persons
The appropriate treatment of the personal income of married individu-
als is one of the most controversial areas of United States income tax pol-
icy.' Under present law, married persons aggregate their incomes on a
joint return so that a married couple is treated as a single taxable unit.'
That joint filing system has two widely recognized drawbacks. First, it is
not "marriage neutral," in that an individual's tax burden may vary with
a change in marital status. Second, it may discourage a non-working
spouse from undertaking paid employment, because it increases the mar-
ginal tax rate faced by the second earner within a couple.
A mandatory separate filing rule would both provide marriage neutral-
ity and eliminate the second earner's disincentive. Nevertheless, joint filing
has been retained because it appears to serve a principle of horizontal
equity by ensuring that couples with equal aggregate incomes pay equal
tax. That principle is premised on the belief that spouses pool their in-
comes and share them equally. Modern theories of marital behavior, how-
ever, indicate that that income-pooling assumption is invalid. This Note
argues that married individuals retain the control and benefits of their
own incomes and that therefore no principle of horizontal equity is pre-
served by the joint filing policy. The Note proposes the abandonment of
joint filing, and suggests administratively workable rules for mandatory
separate filing.
1. See, e.g., Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 223
(H, Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980) (arguing that increases in incidence of divorce and cohabitation
support readoption of separate filing by married couples); McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal
Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C.L. REV. 469 (1980) (supporting retention of
joint filing on equity grounds); Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing? 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423
(1977) (recommending separate filing on grounds of economic efficiency). Continuing controversy over
the question is reflected in legislation recently passed by Congress to modify tax treatment of two-
earner couples. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172
(August 13, 1981), provides for a new deduction designed to reduce the tax burden of married couples
with two earners. Although the new deduction provides some relief from the disadvantages of joint
filing, see pp. 368-70 infra, significant problems remain. See 370-71 infra. For a comprehensive his-
tory of family taxation, see Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389
(1975).
2. Although married couples are permitted to file separately under current law, the applicable
rate schedule is so disadvantageous that only 1.3% of married couples do so. STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MAR-
RIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 48 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION]. Generally, married taxpayers file separately only when they are so alienated from
each other that they prefer not to incur joint and several liability by signing a joint return, or when
filing separately permits them to exceed the three percent of income floor for medical deductions. Id.
at 9.
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I. The Sources of Controversy: A History of Federal Tax Treatment of
Married Couples
In a system of progressive taxation, a choice must be made between
treating a married couple as two separate taxpayers or as a single taxable
unit. Since 1948, federal tax policy has favored taxing a married couple as
a unit even though the joint filing system creates a second earner's disin-
centive and thwarts the goal of marriage neutrality. Congressional dissat-
isfaction with joint filing has resulted in recent legislation designed to tem-
per those effects, but both problems persist.
A. The Conflict Between Marriage Neutrality and Equal Taxation of
Couples
Three conflicting goals of tax policy are implicated in the choice be-
tween taxation of a married couple as a unit or as two separate individu-
als. The first goal, progressivity, requires that tax burdens increase in
greater than direct proportion to increases in income.' The second goal,
marriage neutrality, requires that an individual's tax burden remain unaf-
fected by changes in marital status.4 The third goal, horizontal equity be-
3. Although the question of progressivity has inspired considerable controversy, see W. BLUM &
H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1963), it remains a fundamental prin-
ciple of the personal income tax. Hearings on the Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married
Persons Where Both Spouses Are Working, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1972) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, United
States Dept. of the Treasury) (progressivity a fundamental premise of personal income tax) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1972 Hearings]; G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 6 (1975) (progressive
taxation choice of modem democratic societies); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 58 (pre-
vailing sentiments demand progressivity in direct taxes); Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual
Under the Federal Personal Income Tax, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247, 248 (H. Aaron &
M. Boskin eds. 1980) (same). Progressivity is frequently justified on the grounds that taxpayers at
higher incomes can more easily pay tax on an additional dollar of income than can taxpayers at lower
incomes, who must devote a greater portion of their incomes to nondiscretionary, essential expendi-
tures. See B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 21 (5th ed. 1980) (increasing mar-
ginal ability to pay a principal justification for progressivity); R. GOODE, supra, at 18-21 (same);
Munnell, supra, at 248 (same). A second justification for progressivity is that it lessens economic
inequalities. See B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra, at 21 (progressivity sometimes justified on equalita-
rian principles); R. GOODE, supra, at 20 (reduction of economic inequality through progressivity helps
avoid undemocratic concentrations of political power). Other justifications for a progressive personal
income tax include the need to offset regressive excise and indirect taxes, id. at 58, and the possibility
that high-income taxpayers receive a disproportionately large share of the benefits of governmental
expenditures, J. WINFREY, PUBLIC FINANCE 316 (1973).
4. Concern for marriage neutrality originally focused on the need to avoid a marriage penalty,
because "society places a high value on marriage and the family." Thorson, An Analysis of the
Sources of Continued Controversy Over the Tax Treatment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 113,
122 (1965). The marriage penalty problem remains a primary source of dissatisfaction with joint
filing, see S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 191 (marriage penalties imply "lack of concern on the part of the government for the family")
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Di-
lemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 27, 36 (1978) (disincentives for marriage undesirable); McIntyre, supra
note 1, at 477 (marriage penalty "unhappy feature" of joint filing). Many recent commentators also
protest the existence of any marriage "bonus." See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 1, at 1395 (state should
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tween married couples,5 requires that couples with equal aggregate in-
comes pay equal tax.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to design a system of personal income
taxation that meets all three goals.6 The conflict can be illustrated by an
example involving four taxpayers: A and B who each earn $10,000 annu-
ally, C who earns $20,000, and D who has no income. Under a progres-
sive income tax that taxes all income above $10,000 at a rate of fifty per-
cent, and leaves all income below that level untaxed, C will pay $5,000 in
tax annually, while A, B, and D pay no tax. If A marries B, and C
marries D, marriage neutrality demands that A and B continue to pay no
tax, while C and D pay $5,000. Yet equal taxation of couples demands
that both couples pay the same tax.
Because progressivity is considered a fundamental principle of federal
income tax policy, any system for the taxation of married couples must
preserve it.7 Thus, the conflict among tax goals reduces to a choice be-
tween taxation of the couple as a unit, which permits both progressivity
neither encourage nor discourage marriage through tax incentives or penalties); Brazer, supra note I,
at 229 (personal income tax inappropriate instrument for penalizing those who do not choose hetero-
sexual wedlock blessed by civil or religious authority).
5. Horizontal equity entails similar tax treatment of individuals in similar circumstances; in con-
trast, vertical equity concerns suitable distinctions between taxpayers in admittedly different circum-
stances. Questions of vertical equity arise primarily when determining the different tax burdens that
should be borne by taxpayers at different income levels under a progressive system. See G. BREAK &
J. PECHMAN, supra note 3, at 5-7.
6. Mathematical proof of the logical inconsistency among progressivity, marriage neutrality, and
equal taxation of couples can be shown as follows:
Assume that A and B have equal incomes, C has an income equal to the combined income of A
and B, and D has no income. Let T(A), T(B), T(C), and T(D) be the tax burdens of the
respective individuals. A progressive tax system requires that:
(1) T(C) > T(A) + T(B).
Now assume that A marries B, and C marries D. Equal taxation of couples demands that:
(2) T(AB) = T(CD).
Marriage neutrality demands that:
(3) T(A) + T(B) = T(AB)
and that:
(4) T(C) = T(CD).
Substituting equations (3) and (4) into (2) yields:
T(A) + T(B) = T(C),
which contradicts progressivity equation (1).
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 26 n.1.
7. See note 3 supra. Although some degree of progressivity is considered fundamental to the in-
come tax, there is disagreement about the most appropriate rate, especially in light of recent rates of
inflation. As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172
(August 13, 1981), the rate schedules for individual taxpayers were revised to reduce overall progres-
sivity somewhat by reducing the 70% maximum rate on individual income to 50% by 1984. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. Because of the relationship between progressivity and marriage neutral-
ity, this "flattening" of the progressive schedule has in turn reduced the marriage bonus or penalty a
couple may face. See note 6 supra.
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and equal taxation of couples, and taxation of the couple as two separate
individuals, which preserves progressivity and marriage neutrality
B. The Adoption of Joint Filing
Prior to 1948, married persons and single persons were taxed alike as
separate individuals under a single rate schedule.' Married couples who
lived in the community property states of the South and Southwest, how-
ever, were permitted to divide their income evenly between spouses and to
file separate returns."0 Because this even division of income lowered a
couple's tax burden under the progressive rate schedule whenever one
spouse earned more than half of the couple's income, married persons in
community property jurisdictions paid less tax than similarly situated
married persons residing in states with common law marital rules.
In 1948, Congress eliminated that geographical disparity by permitting
all married taxpayers to file joint returns that taxed family income at the
same rate as if it were earned equally by two single individuals, thus
extending the benefits of "income splitting" to residents of common law as
well as community property states. The resulting shift in tax policy from
marriage neutrality to equal taxation of couples was neither carefully con-
sidered nor consciously intended."1
8. See, e.g., 1972 Hearings, supra note 3, at 78 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen) (because progres-
sivity is central to personal income tax, problem reduces to choice between taxation of married couples
as units or as separate taxpayers); Bittker, supra note 1, at 1395-96 (expressing dilemma as choice
between individual and family-unit taxation); Rosen, supra note 1, at 423-425 (same).
9. While married couples could aggregate their incomes and file a joint return prior to 1948,
under a single rate schedule joint returns were usually disadvantageous. Joint filing might be prefera-
ble if a couple desired to aggregate their incomes to increase adjusted gross income on the return and
raise the ceiling on allowable deductions for charitable contributions. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400
n.20.
10. In Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the Supreme Court held that under the community
property laws of the state of Washington, the wife's legal right to one-half of her husband's income
had to be recognized under the then-existing tax statute. As a result, the Court concluded that the
taxpayer and his wife had to be allowed to file separate returns on which each reported one-half of
the family income. For further analysis of the judicial treatment of community property laws before
and after Poe v. Seaborn, see Bittker, supra note 1, at 1399-1415.
11. As tax rates increased during World War II, the advantages of community property "income
splitting" became more visible, and common law states began to adopt community property rules
solely for their tax benefits. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 22-23. In 1948,
spurred by the prospect of widespread adoption of community property laws, Congress considered
various solutions to the geographical disparities in tax rates. The extension of income-splitting benefits
to married couples in common law states enjoyed great support for three reasons: First, it was not
politically feasible to deprive residents of community property states of the income-splitting advantages
they had so long enjoyed. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1412. See H. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT
OF THE FAMILY 63 (1963) (vehement opposition of community property states prevented passage of
1941 legislation attributing community property income to actual earner for federal tax purposes).
Second, many Congressmen supported a tax cut opposed by the President, and thought the support of
community property states for a tax bill incorporating income splitting would aid passage over a
Presidential veto. Id. at 64-65; Oldman & Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Marr-
fled Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 593-94 (1960) (same). Third, extension of the benefits of income
splitting to married couples in common law states allowed Congress to claim the political credit that
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C. The Defects of Joint Filing
The adoption of the new joint return in 1948 permitted a tax reduction
for individuals who married, unless their incomes were already earned so
equally that income splitting provided no benefit. Congress came to regard
this marriage "bonus" as excessive," particularly because married couples
were perceived as enjoying economies of scale in the purchase of food,
housing, and other goods and services. 3 Congress' desire to reduce the
marriage bonus led in 1969 to the adoption of a new schedule of tax rates
that limited a single person's tax liability to no more than 120% that of a
married couple with the same income. 4
The adoption of the new singles' schedule has created its own problems.
For the couple whose income is earned primarily by one partner, tax lia-
bility is still reduced upon marriage. But a married couple whose income
is earned equally by each spouse now suffers an increase in tax burden
under joint filing. To prevent such couples from filing separately to take
advantage of the 1969 singles' schedule, Congress provided that married
couples filing separate returns must be taxed under the old singles' sched-
ule, now the most disadvantageous of all." The changes in 1969 thus re-
duced the marriage bonus at the cost of creating a new marriage penalty.
The present joint filing system is consequently characterized by an arbi-
trary system of incentives and disincentives for marriage that are deter-
mined by a couple's income and the proportions in which that income is
would otherwise have gone to the state legislatures, which were rapidly adopting community property
laws in previously common law states. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1413. The need for a politically
feasible solution to the geographical disparities in taxation arising out of Poe v. Seaborn thus led to a
radical but largely unintended shift away from marriage neutrality toward equal taxation of couples.
See H. GROVES, supra at 17 (income splitting on joint return product of historical developments
rather than design; resulting bizarre changes in preexisting tax distribution probably neither carefully
weighed nor consciously intended); Bittker, supra note 1, at 1416 (enactment of joint filing system
occurred without discussion of effects on marriage neutrality); Oldman & Temple, supra, at 593
(adoption of income-splitting joint return probably product of political expediency rather than con-
scious policy decision to reallocate tax burden).
12. By 1969, a single individual might pay as much as 42% more tax than a married couple with
the same income. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 23. Congress regarded this
disparity as too great. Id.
13. While two may not live as cheaply as one, it was argued, a married couple could still live
more cheaply than two single individuals; for example, apartments could be shared and one newspa-
per or autombile would do instead of two. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1422-25. Some commentators
suggest, however, that the argument that married couples enjoy economies of scale that single persons
do not is problematic, because single persons also have the option of living in a household with family
members or other individuals. H. GROVES, supra note 11, at 94 n.2; Pechman, Income Splitting, in H.
STEIN & J. PECHMAN, ESSAYS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 49, 55-56 (1959); Surrey, Family Income and
Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980, 985 (1946). In fact, most singles do share households. See Gerzog,
supra note 4, at 35 (62.5% of single persons share their homes with another).
14. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
15. Rosen, supra note 1, at 427. Separate filing by married persons still may be advantageous
under limited circumstances. See note 2 supra.
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earned by each spouse. 16 While there is no evidence as to the number of
taxpayers who have actually refrained from entering marriage or who
have sought divorce solely for tax reasons, the amounts of tax liability
involved can be considerable. For a couple whose total income in 1979
was $50,000, marriage could result in an annual tax bonus of $3,344 or
an annual tax penalty of $2,674, depending on the percentage of joint
income earned by each spouse." That marriage penalty has resulted in
some well-publicized cases of happily married couples who obtained an-
nual "tax divorces."'' Even if the effects of joint filing do not extensively
influence most taxpayers' behavior, the existence of penalties and bonuses
for marriage has been widely criticized as an arbitrary and undesirable
government intrusion into private activity.1 9
A second major disadvantage of joint filing is the creation of a second
earner's disincentive. Joint filing discourages a non-working person with a
working spouse from employment, because his first dollar earned will be
taxed at the same high marginal rate as the last dollar earned by the
couple's primary earner.20 A second earner within a couple must also sac-
16. As a general rule, marriage will increase a couple's tax burden whenever the lesser-earning
spouse earns 20% or more of the couple's total income, and decrease a couple's tax burden whenever
the lesser-earning spouse earns less than 20%. Gerzog, supra note 4, at 28. See also JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 29 (table of effect of marriage on individual's tax liability accord-
ing to family income and percentage of family income earned by lesser-earning spouse). The magni-
tude of the marriage penalty or bonus may also be affected by the number of dependents in the
household; in 1951, Congress enacted the Head of Household (HOH) rate schedule, which gives
unmarried or divorced taxpayers supporting dependents half the income-splitting benefits of joint
filing. That is, it taxes their returns at a rate midway between that applied to a married couple's joint
return, and that applied to a single person's return. The HOH schedule thus increases the divorce
"bonus" for spouses earning equal incomes who support dependents. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXA-
TION, supra note 2, at 23, 37.
17. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 29 (table showing effect of marriage on
tax liabilities at selected income levels and earning splits between husband and wife).
18. Feld, Divorce Tax Style, 54 TAXES 608, 609 (1976); Haitch, Tax Split, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1981, § A, at 49, col. 5. In 1976, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that it will not recognize such
divorces for tax purposes because they are "sham" transactions. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40.
Two taxpayers challenged the Service's position in the United States Tax Court. Boyter v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980). The Tax Court, however, never reached the Commissioner's argument
that taxpayers' annual divorces were a sham, holding against taxpayers on the theory that the divorces
were legally invalid, having been obtained in foreign courts that had no jurisdiction to grant them.
19. See, e.g., note 4 supra (original concern for marriage neutrality primarily concern to avoid
marriage disincentives; recent commentators also criticize creation of incentives for only legal, hetero-
sexual unions); Munnell, supra note 3, at 247-49 (tax burden should not vary with marital status);
Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under Present Income Tax Laws, 49 TAXES 526,
536-38 (1971) (same). But see McIntyre, supra note 1, at 472 (marriage penalty undesirable, but
marriage bonus justifiable recognition of real changes in individual's economic circumstances that oc-
cur upon marriage).
20. In the absence of any income tax, individuals would choose to work only as long as the extra
income from an additional hour of paid employment exceeds the value of an additional hour of leisure
time. Income taxes reduce an individual's net wage, creating incentives to work longer hours to main-
tain previ9us levels of consumption (the "income effect"). They also create incentives to work shorter
hours, by increasing the value of leisure time relative to the individual's declining net wage (the
"substitution effect"). Because the income and substitution effects conflict, the overall impact of taxes
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rifice time that otherwise might be spent providing household and child-
care services, which are not taxed as imputed income.2" Further, second
earners entering employment face additional nondeductible work-related
expenses.
With the growing acceptance of two-earner couples, 2 the possible eco-
nomic inefficiency 23 associated with the second earner's disincentive has
become a source of increasing concern.24 Further, because most second
earners are married women,2 the disincentive is also criticized for rein-
on the number of hours spent in paid employment depends on the relative strengths of these effects.
Studies of the labor force participation of males indicate that income taxes have little effect on partici-
pation, perhaps because factors other than money play an important part in motivation. See Munnell,
supra note 3, at 264 (labor force participation of adult males largely unaffected by tax rates); cr
Rosen, supra note 1, at 426 n.15 (increase in family income through wife's employment has little
effect on husband's labor force participation). Empirical studies of the labor force participation of
married women, who are generally the second earners within a married couple, see note 25 infra,
suggest that their labor force participation is very sensitive to changes in their tax rate. JOINT COM-
MITFrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 36. Several researchers have found married women's response
to a tax increase to be greater than unity; that is, a 10% decrease in net real wage due to a tax
increase will result in a more than 10% decrease in the number of hours spent in paid employment.
Munnell, supra note 3, at 265; Rosen, supra note 1, at 426. One commentator has criticized these
studies on the ground that they measured only the marginal responses of women already in the
workforce, and not the behavior of married women making the initial decision to enter employment.
McIntyre, supra note 1, at 486-87. Intuition suggests, however, that married women deciding to un-
dertake paid employment would be even more sensitive to tax rates, because they must also face the
threshold loss of their household and childcare services, and incur threshold employment-related
expenses.
21. It can be argued that the disincentive associated with the loss of imputed income derives not
from joint filing but from the failure of the tax system to tax imputed income from such self-per-
formed services. Due to the difficulties that would have to be overcome to tax such imputed income
fairly, however, taxation of imputed income has generally been dismissed as unfeasible. See p. 377
infra.
22. D. RICE, DUAL CAREER MARRIAGE 1-4 (1979). During the early 1940's, only about 15% to
20% of married couples contained two earners. By 1980, this figure had risen to nearly 50%. Mun-
nell, supra note 3, at 261.
23. Economic efficiency is achieved when individuals allocate scarce resources so as to obtain the
highest possible level of satisfaction. G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, supra note 3, at 7. For example, a
person will allocate his time between work and leisure in the most efficient manner by working until
the income from an additional hour of employment equals his subjective value for an hour of leisure.
An economically efficient tax raises revenue while minimizing the incentives for taxpayers to alter
their original, efficient behavior. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS].
24. Any income tax is inherently inefficient, because it alters the wage rewards associated with the
allocation of time to paid employment. Brazer, supra note 1, at 227. The current use of the married
couple as a single taxable unit, however, exacerbates this inefficiency. Married women are much more
sensitive than men to changes in their tax rates, see note 20 supra, and much more likely to alter their
employment behavior inefficiently to avoid tax. Yet married women, generally the second earners in a
couple, face the greatest marginal tax rates under the joint filing system. Separate filing is conse-
quently superior to joint filing on efficiency grounds. Brazer, supra note 1, at 227-28; Munnell, supra
note 3, at 263-65; Rosen, supra note 1, at 426-27.
25. The description of married women as "second" earners is not intended to imply that their
employment is somehow less important or significant than that of men. Married women are "second"
earners in the sense that their employment appears to be much more discretionary; they enter or leave
the market place frequently while the employment of married men remains constant. See JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 36; Munnell, supra note 3, at 264; Rosen, supra note 1, at
426.
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forcing sexual stereotypes by encouraging married women to remain at
home producing more traditional household and childcare services.26
D. The Second Earner's Deduction
Concern over both the second earner's disincentive and the marriage
penalty has induced Congress to write still another chapter in the history
of the federal tax treatment of married couples. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 permits married couples with two earners a new tax
deduction based on the earnings of the lesser-earning spouse."7 In 1982,
married couples filing joint returns will be allowed to deduct from their
taxable income five percent of the lesser of $30,000 or the earned income
of the lesser-earning spouse. For 1983 and subsequent years, the deduc-
tion will be ten percent."
While the deduction provides some relief from the undesirable effects of
joint filing, it stops far short of achieving marriage neutrality or eliminat-
ing the second earner's disincentive. First, the deduction does not reduce
the tax bonus enjoyed by married persons whose incomes are relatively
unequal. 9 Second, while the deduction reduces the marriage penalty paid
by married individuals with relatively equal incomes, significant penalties
still remain. For a couple whose total income in 198430 is $50,000, mar-
riage could result in an annual tax penalty of $1,142."' Third, the deduc-
tion does not eliminate the second earner's disincentive. For example, an
unmarried person undertaking employment at $15,000 a year can expect
to pay twelve percent or $1,801 in tax in 1984. An individual whose
spouse earns $30,000 would pay thirty percent or $4,533 in additional tax
on the same income. The new ten percent deduction would decrease that
26. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1433 (reasonable to describe joint filing system as biased against
married women); Gerzog, supra note 4, at 36-37 (joint filing reinforces stereotypical notions of mar-
ried women's appropriate roles).
27. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172 (August 13,
1981).
28. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30. The 1981 Act also contains provisions that "flatten" the
rate schedules by reducing the marginal tax rates faced by high-income taxpayers. Because of the
relationship between progressivity and marriage neutrality, these rate reductions, which will be
phased in fully by 1984, also reduce slightly the second earner's disincentive and the tax penalties or
bonuses associated with marriage. See note 6 supra.
29. In fact, where a couple has two earners (and therefore qualifies to take the deduction) but
more than 80% of joint income is earned by one spouse (so that the couple already enjoys a marriage
bonus, see note 16 supra), the deduction will increase the amount of that bonus.
30. 1984 figures are used to incorporate fully the effects of the rate reductions provided by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172 (August 13, 1981).
31. These calculations are derived from the 1984 rate schedules provided in the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172 (August 13, 1981), and assume that the
taxpayers do not itemize and have no dependents. Under the same assumptions, a couple with a joint
income of $15,000 could face a tax bonus of $338 or a tax penalty of $71 upon marriage; a couple
with a $30,000 income could face a $1,458 bonus or a $731 penalty; and a couple with a $100,000
income could face a $5,935 bonus or a $3,280 penalty.
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tax bill only to $4,038, or twenty-seven percent of the second earner's
income. 2
II. The Problem of Horizontal Equity
Despite the widely recognized drawbacks of joint filing," no commenta-
tor has advocated its abandonment until very recently? 4 The continuing
popularity of joint filing arises from the belief that it is more important to
32. Again, these calculations are from the 1984 rate schedules provided in the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172 (August 13, 1981), and assume taxpayers do
not itemize and have no dependents. Under those assumptions, a taxpayer whose spouse earns
$15,000 would pay a tax of 20% on an additional $15,000 in earnings, and use of the new deduction
would reduce this rate only to 17%. A taxpayer undertaking employment at $25,000 a year, who
would pay 17% tax on that income if unmarried, would pay 30% tax if his spouse also earned
S25,000 (a rate reduced to 26% by the new deduction) and would pay 40% tax if his spouse earned
$50,000 (a rate reduced only to 36% by the deduction).
33. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 26-37; G. BREAK & J.
PECHMAN, supra note 3, at 32-36. In the past, numerous proposals have been suggested to remedy, at
least partially, the defects of joint filing. The 1976 childcare credit, I.R.C. § 44A, is designed to
compensate for the loss of childcare and household services that occurs when both spouses are em-
ployed, and is available only to two-earner couples and single persons who incur expenses for care of
a dependent in order to undertake paid employment. Other suggested proposals included a limited
deduction or credit of some percentage of the earnings of the lesser-earning spouse. See JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 6-7. Somewhat similar is the "Pechman plan," under which
married couples would file joint returns taxed at the same rate as unmarried individuals' returns, but
would receive in addition a special deduction or credit based on the earnings of the lesser-earning
spouse. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 95-97 (3d ed. 1977). Another proposal would permit
married couples to file separate returns under the 1969 singles' schedule, if they perceive such filing to
be advantageous. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 6; Gerzog, supra note 4, at 47-
48. A nonprogressive, flat-rate income tax with a per-taxpayer refundable credit also has been pro-
posed. Such a system would provide for equal taxation of couples with equal incomes, marriage neu-
trality, and some limited progressivity. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 7; Rankin,
Plans to Ease the Marriage Levy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1980, § D, at 2, col. 3.
In fact, none of these proposals completely remedies the defects of joint filing. A deduction or credit
based on the earnings of the lesser-earning spouse fails to acheive complete marriage neutrality or
elimination of the second earner's disincentive. See p. 369 supra (failure of deduction provided by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172 (August 13, 1981), to
acheive these goals). Permitting married couples the option of filing separately under the 1969 singles'
schedule would eliminate the marriage penalty, but a marriage bonus would persist for those couples
whose income was earned disproportionately enough that joint filing was still advantageous, and the
second earner's disincentive would persist for these couples as well. Given the importance of progres-
sivity to the personal income tax, see p. 364 supra, elimination of this fundamental principle seems a
visionary approach to the problems of marriage neutrality and the second earner's disincentive.
Gerzog, supra note 4, at 44.
34. Rosen, supra note 1, who recommended mandatory separate filing in 1977 on grounds of
economic efficiency, appears to be the first commentator to suggest seriously a return to the individual
tax unit. More recent champions of mandatory separate filing include Brazer, supra note 1, and
Munnell, supra note 3, both of whom suggest that increases in cohabitation, employment of married
women, and divorce incidence have made the individual tax unit more attractive.
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ensure that married couples with equal incomes pay equal tax"5 than to
avoid variations in individual tax liability based on marital status.'6
That belief is premised, however, upon an assumption that married
persons pool incomes. 7 The concept of income pooling, while widely ac-
cepted,3" remains without empirical support." In fact, modern studies of
35. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 26-28 (joint filing premised on desira-
bility of equal taxation of couples); McIntyre, supra note 1, at 470-71 (equity demands that couples
with equal incomes bear equal tax burdens). Even Munnell, who supports mandatory separate filing,
believes that the need for equal taxation of couples presents the "most serious" objection to separate
filing. Munnell, supra note 3, at 278. Nevertheless, many of the recent proposals to remedy the defects
of joint filing would also compromise the principle of equal taxation of couples. For example, the
second earner's deduction recently adopted by Congress, see p. 370 supra, will ensure that two-earner
couples pay less tax than one-earner couples with the same joint income. Because the benefit of that
proposal increases in direct proportion to the second earner's income, couples whose incomes are
earned equally by each spouse will also pay less tax than other two-earner couples with the same
aggregate income, earned less evenly by each spouse. This would also be true for couples who file
separately under an optional separate filing scheme. Interestingly, these equity effects have not pro-
voked much comment. One commentator, however, has noted the detrimental effect of optional
separate filing on the equal taxation of couples. See Gerzog, supra note 4, at 44-45.
36. Secondarily, joint filing provides an easy solution to the administrative problem of policing tax
avoidance through interspousal transfers of income-producing assets and credits, deductions, and ex-
emptions. Because income and deductions are attributed to the couple as a unit, allocation between
spouses is irrelevant. Joint filing also solves the pre-1948 problem of geographical disparities in the
tax treatment of married couples in community property and common law states, by extending the
benefits of Poe v. Seaborn, note 10 supra, to all married couples. These geographical disparities,
however, can also be easily eliminated under mandatory separate filing by a statutory override of
community property laws for purposes of federal income taxation. See note 60 infra.
37. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29 (equal taxation of couples appropriate because married
couples frequently pool incomes and consume as unit); JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note
2, at 27 (attractiveness of principle of equal taxation of couples depends on extent to which spouses
pool incomes and single individuals do not); McIntyre, supra note 1, at 470 (reality or perceived
reality of marital pooling is underpinning for joint filing); Thorson, supra note 4, at 116 (income
pooling implies married couple is appropriate taxable unit).
It should be noted that the tax system's recognition of pooling behavior through joint filing has itself
been criticized as a source of horizontal inequity between similar households because children, depen-
dent parents, cohabitating couples and homosexual companions may also pool incomes. Income could
be split on a joint return not only between husband and wife, but among other household members as
well. While even the supporters of joint filing have recognized that marriage is not a necessary condi-
tion for pooling, see Bittker, supra note 1, at 1398-1400; McIntyre, supra note I, at 480, the restric-
tion of the income-splitting benefits of the joint return to married couples has been justified as an
easily administered "bright line" test for pooling arrangements. Nevertheless, a proposal to permit
income splitting among family members in addition to spouses was suggested in 1946 by Surrey, then
Tax Legislative Counsel to the Secretary of the Treasury. See Surrey, supra note 13, at 986.
Joint filing has also been criticized as a source of horizontal inequity between similar couples be-
cause it does not account for the real benefits that one-earner couples enjoy over two-earner couples
with the same income, due to the household and childcare services a nonworking spouse can provide
and the absence of an additional set of nondeductible employment-related expenses. See, e.g., Bittker,
supra note 1, at 1425-26; Brazer, supra note 1, at 242; Gerzog, supra note 4, at 33. Those differences
between one- and two-earner couples may persist beyond the initial entrance of the second earner into
employment. Thorson, supra note 4, at 116-17. As the income of the lesser-earning spouse rises, it is
likely that his employment expenses will rise as well. Similarly, less time is available for the provision
of untaxed household services; at lower income levels, second earners are often employed in part-time
positions. With the recent rise in the representation of two-earner couples, see note 22 supra, this
inequity between one- and two-earner couples has become a greater source of concern.
38. See McIntyre, supra note 1, at 471 (no serious challenges have been made to assumption of
widespread marital pooling). Even the supporters of mandatory separate filing have not challenged the
income pooling assumption. See, e.g., Brazer, supra note 1, at 226; Munnell, supra note 3, at 247-48;
Separate Filing
the family suggest that married persons retain the control and benefits of
their personal incomes. Concern for horizontal equity in personal income
taxation is therefore better served by taxing individual rather than joint
income.
A. Marital Income Sharing Patterns: Pooling or Exchange?
Under the joint filing system, income splitting is usually justified by the
assumption that, while a greater-earning spouse may have legal possession
of his income, the actual control and benefits of the income will be shared
equally by both spouses."0 Because family consumption decisions are pre-
sumed to be joint decisions, both spouses are perceived to gain an equal
benefit from an increase in family income regardless of which spouse
earns it.
But exchange theory, one of the dominant modern perspectives on social
behavior,41 suggests that married individuals do not enjoy access to their
Rosen, supra note 1, at 425. Rather than questioning the pooling presumption, these authors have
argued that the need for horizontal equity between couples is outweighed by other considerations. See
note 34 supra. Pechman also accepts the premise of income pooling, but objects to the income-splitting
benefits of joint filing on the ground that the decision to marry and pool income is voluntary, and
should be ignored for tax purposes just like any other consumption decision. Pechman, supra note 13,
at 55.
39. H. GROVES, supra note 11, at 70; McIntyre, supra note 1, at 469. Thorson claims to have
discovered a "consensus" that married couples pool income, but he gives no empirical support for this
finding. Thorson, supra note 4, at 116. Even commentators who accept the pooling presumption note
that pooling may not occur between high-income spouses. H. GROVES, supra note 11, at 70; Bittker,
supra note 1, at 1394; Thorson, supra note 4, at 116. Yet the benefits of income splitting are greatest
for high-income couples, because low-income taxpayers are already taxed at such low rates that in-
come splitting makes little difference; for example, a one-earner couple filing a joint return with an
income of 85,000 enjoys a marriage bonus of $250, or 5% of after-tax income, while a one-earner
couple with an income of $50,000 enjoys a marriage bonus of $3,344, or 9.2% of after-tax income.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 29 (table showing effect of marriage on tax liabil-
ity in dollar amounts at selected income levels and earnings splits between husband and wife), id. at
30 (table showing effect of marriage on tax liability as percentage of family income, at selected income
levels and earnings splits between husband and wife).
40. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1420-21 (married person has less legal, emotional, and social
control over his income); McIntyre, supra note 1, at 475-76 (to tax primary earner in couple on his
full income is to tax "potential" rather than actual income, and is inconsistent with principle of taxing
income to individual with control or enjoyment of income); Thorson, supra note 4, at 116 (technical
title over income does not indicate actual control or benefits that accrue to married taxpayer).
41. Although "some variant of the rational choice [exchange theory] approach has long been with
us," A. HEATH, RATIONAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE 184 (1976), modern American exchange
theory has its roots in two seminal works: P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE (1964),
and G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961). While exchange analysis is a
relatively recent development in sociological theory, it has gained widespread appeal. It was regarded
as an emerging perspective as recently as the early 1970's. W. GOODE, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL
THEORY 98-99 (1973) (noting "the many 'exchange theories' that have been developed of late");
Spengler, Contemporary Approachei to Societal Analysis, in THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY 486 (J. Mc-
Kinney & E. Tiryakian eds. 1970) (exchange analysis emerging field). By the late 1970's, however,
exchange theory had become "one of the most prominent theoretical perspectives in sociology," J.
TURNER, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 215 (rev. ed. 1978). See P. EKEH, SOCIAL
EXCHANGE THEORY 81 (1974) (exchange theory major sociological perspective); A. HEATH, supra, at
184 (exchange analysis "a standard tool of the mainstream sociologist"); J. TURNER, supra, at 278 n.1
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spouse's income in a manner that would suppport the assumption of uni-
lateral, uncompensated income transfers.42 According to exchange theory,
people will not normally incur costs without expecting compensation in
one form or another, so that goal-seeking individuals must exchange re-
sources and services.43 Social relationships thus result from individuals'
dependence upon the expenditures of other persons to accomplish their
own goals,44 and individuals enter relationships primarily to engage in a
beneficial exchange of both economic and noneconomic resources.
The resources that will be exchanged within any social relationship,
including marriage, need not be economic or even similar in kind. 5 When
(exchange theory has gained wide appeal in sociological theorizing). The basic theoretical principles
are presented in P. BLAU, supra, and G. HOMANS, supra. For more modern syntheses of Homan's and
Blau's works, see P. EKEH, supra; A. HEATH, supra; and J. TURNER, supra, at 201-309.
42. While exchange theorists do not claim that exchange is the root of all behavior, they do argue
that most, if not all, social relationships can be usefully viewed as exchanges between goal-seeking
individuals expecting to profit from such transactions. P. BLAU, supra note 41, at 88 ("Social ex-
change can be observed everywhere ... not only in market relations but also in friendship and even in
love."); A. HEATH, supra note 41, at 1-2 (social exchange the basis of a wide range of human rela-
tionships); G. HOMANS, supra note 41, at 13-14 (same). Exchange theory has been widely accepted as
an especially useful vehicle for analysis of the marital relationship. See C. HARRIS, THE FAMILY 160
(1969) (marriage relationships maintained by exchange between partners); L. SCANZONI & J.
SCANZONI, MEN WOMEN AND CHANGE: A SOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 11 (1976)
("Sociologists may look at many areas related to the family in terms of exchange theory."); E. WAL-
STER & G. WALSTER, A NEW LOOK AT LOVE 135 (1978) (considerable evidence supports application
of exchange theory to dating and courtship, marital choice, and marital satisfaction); R. WINCH, FA-
MILIAL ORGANIZATION: A QUEST FOR DETERMINANTS 7, 98-100 (1977) (noting particular relevance
of exchange analysis to familial behavior, and suggesting that exchange of male's hunting ability for
female's childbearing and foodgathering abilities may have formed basis for first family units); Ed-
wards, Familial Behavior as Social Exchange, 31 J. MARR. & FAM. 521-23 (1969) (social exchange
evident in dating and mate selection research and in allocation of authority in the family decisionmak-
ing process); Nye, Choice, Exchange, and the Family in 2 CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ABOUT THE
FAMILY 1, 11-39 (W. Burr, R. Hill, F. Nye, & I. Reiss eds. 1979) (exchange theory successfully
applied to several areas of familial behavior, including labor force participation of married women,
sexual behavior, marital choice and dissolution).
43. The presumption of goal-seeking rationality is central to exchange theory. People are assumed
to be motivated to enter social relationships by the prospect of some return, be it psychic or economic.
See P. BLAU, supra note 41, at 91-92, 98; G. HOMANS, supra note 41, at 61-62. The benefit is not
always obvious; it may spring from the satisfaction of internalized norms or the approval of third
parties. Nevertheless, altruism is ultimately reduced to egoism. P. BLAU, supra note 41, at 17. Social
relationships arise when both parties stand to benefit from an exchange; that is, when each has some-
thing the other wants. See id. at 92; G. HOMANS, supra note 41, at 61; Edwards, supra note 42, at
518-19.
44. See P. BLAU, supra note 41, at 14-15; Edwards, supra note 42, at 518-19.
45. See P. BLAU, supra note 41, at 99-100. Cf R. BLOOD & D. WOLFE, HUSBANDS AND WIVES
12, 32 (1960) (income important resource in marital exchange); B. MURSTEIN, WHO WILL MARRY
WHOM? 110-11 (1976) (physical attractiveness an exchangeable resource); L. SCANZONI & J.
SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 86, 96 (sexual intimacy exchangeable resource). Individuals who rank
high on one resource scale may use their advantage to obtain a spouse who ranks high on another; an
individual who is very attractive physically may use his status as a desirable companion to woo a
spouse who is less attractive but has more prestige and power. B. MURSTEIN, supra, at 110-11; E.
WALSTER & G. WALSTER, supra note 42, at 139-41. The bargaining power associated with a resource
depends not only on its absolute value but also on the available alternatives. See L. SCANZONI & J.
SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 312-13. The importance of a spouse's income as a resource will be
determined not only by the amount of this income but also by what the other partner might earn if he
were himself to enter employment.
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both spouses earn substantial incomes, there may be no exchanges of in-
come or property between them at all, but only exchanges of noneconomic
resources such as emotional support, sexual intimacy, enhanced socioeco-
nomic status, or the satisfaction of having fulfilled a desired social role.46
If one spouse earns more than the other, though, the greater-earning part-
ner may transfer some of the benefits of his income to the lesser-earning
spouse in return for an additional share of nonmonetary resources and
services. So, for example, one spouse may exchange cash acquired through
employment for household and childcare services and emotional support
provided by the other spouse.
Married individuals do not necessarily expect immediate compensation
for every service provided to a spouse. According to exchange theory, how-
ever, there is a long-run expectation of reciprocity in marriage as in any
other relationship. 48 When selecting spouses, individuals tend to choose
partners with whom they believe a marital "contract" can be arranged
under which the total exchange of services will leave them better off dur-
ing marriage than before. If an individual's exchange expectations are
not fulfilled, the exchange "contract" may be renegotiated so that the rela-
tionship remains superior to other possibilities."0 One of the best docu-
mented examples of such renegotiation is the redistribution of family deci-
sionmaking power that accompanies a change in the distribution of
income or economic resources between spouses: an increase in the eco-
46. Such marriages have been described as "equal partner" arrangements, in which spouses are
less concerned with providing instrumental services, such as income or household services, than with
exchanging expressive resources such as companionship, emotional support, and sexual intimacy. L.
SCANZONI & J. SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 235, 287.
47. H. ROSS & I. SAWHILL, TIME OF TRANSITION: THE GROWTH OF FAMILIES HEADED BY WO-
MEN 45 (1975) (spouse who earns disproportionate amount of income "may use his position to redis-
tribute family income in his favor, to establish greater authority within the family, or to obtain other
nonmonetary perquisites"); L. SCANZONI & J. SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 124, 260, 287, 476
(describing exchange pattern as "traditional" marriage arrangement, in which husbands seek wives to
perform housekeeping services and "expressive functions" of providing comfort, support, encourage-
ment, and respect, while wives seek husbands "who appear able to provide them with the kinds of
economic security, status, and material comfort they define as acceptable").
48. Cf. P. BLAU, supra note 41, at 16-17 (expectation of reciprocity in social relationships); P.
EKEH, supra note 41, at 47 (same); Edwards, supra note 42, at 519 (same).
49. See C. HARRIS, supra note 42, at 160 (marriage is contractual relationship entered after bar-
gaining on terms); B. MURSTEIN, supra note 45, at 272-73 (exchange theory has empirical success in
predicting marital choice); L. SCANZONI & J. SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 110 (marriage decision
reached only after mutually favorable implicit exchange "bargain" emerges); Edwards, supra note 42,
at 521-23 (social exchange and bargaining for resources clearly evident in dating and mate selection).
50. C. HARRIS, supra note 42, at 160-63 (exchange continues after marriage so that marital roles
are further defined through bargaining process affected by relative power of spouses); L. SCANZONI &
J. SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 258, 321-23, 480 (marriage continual process of exchange and renego-
tiation under changing circumstances); E. WALSTER & G. WALSTER, supra note 42, at 142-45 (retain-
ing reciprocal equity of exchange important for stable relationship); c. D. RICE, supra note 22, at 12
(wife's decision, after marriage, to pursue career produces strain between spouses that must be re-
solved through renegotiation or divorce).
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nomic resources that a marital partner can offer leads to a corresponding
increase in that partner's control over the uses of joint income.5
Married persons generally attempt to resolve inequities in their rela-
tionship through renegotiation, because the process of divorce entails sub-
stantial economic and noneconomic costs. 2 Nevertheless, when extreme
disparities in exchange cannot be reconciled, alternatives to the marriage
become more attractive, and divorce more likely.5 3
B. The Implications of Exchange Theory for Joint Filing: The Problem
of Income Attribution
Under exchange theory, the income-splitting benefits of the joint return
can only be justified as a means of recognizing that, after interspousal
exchanges of resources take place, the lesser-earning spouse will have the
control and benefit of approximately one-half of joint income. Yet there
are two reasons to suggest that the recognition of such marital exchanges
of income through joint filing is an inappropriate and undesirable means
of meeting horizontal equity concerns.
First, although attribution of one-half of joint income to each spouse is
consistent with the income-pooling presumption that a lesser-earning
spouse has direct access to a greater-earning spouse's income, under ex-
change theory the greater-earning spouse retains the benefit of his income
and uses it to strike a more favorable marriage "contract." Joint filing
thus gives an implicit deduction to a primary earner for that part of his
income that is exchanged for nonmonetary resources and services provided
by his spouse. Although taxpayers are permitted to deduct expenses in-
curred in the production of income or the pursuit of a trade or business, 4
they generally are not permitted to deduct the costs of goods and services
purchased for personal consumption.5 If taxpayer expenditures for en-
hanced status, companionship, or household and childcare services ordina-
51. R. BLOOD & D. WOLFE, supra note 45, at 12-13, 32 (decisionmaking power within married
couples fluctuates between partners in accordance with spouses' changes in workforce participation
and income); A. HEATH, supra note 41, at 105-12 (same); H. Ross & I. SAWHILL, supra note 47, at
42-45 (same).
52. Individuals contemplating divorce face intangible costs such as third party disapproval and the
violation of internalized norms, as well as the more obvious costs of obtaining a legal agreement and
facing disruption in career and living patterns. E. WALSTER & G. WALSTER, supra note 42, at 146;
Nye, supra note 42, at 26.
53. See L. SCANZONI & J. SCANZONI, supra note 42, at 11, 463-64 (divorce result of breakdown
in renegotiation of marital exchange); E. WALSTER & G. WALSTER, supra note 42, at 146 (inequita-
ble exchange likely to lead to dissolution of relationship); cf H. ROSS & I. SAWHILL, supra note 47, at
41-42, 47 (wife's direct access to income through employment reduces dependency and increases at-
tractiveness of alternatives to marriage, thereby reducing cost and increasing likelihood of divorce).
54. I.R.C. §§ 162, 165, 212.
55. I.R.C. § 262.
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rily are not deductible," a primary earner who exchanges income for such
consumption goods within the marital bond should not be given a deduc-
tion for those "purchases."
Second, the services that may be provided by a lesser-earning spouse in
exchange for cash income generally are not recognized as sources of in-
come under the Internal Revenue Code. Even services that produce in-
come when performed for a formal employer, such as childcare and
household services, are not recognized as sources of income when they are
performed by the taxpayer for himself or a household member. Other re-
sources exchanged by spouses, such as emotional support, sexual intimacy,
and enhanced socioeconomic status, are not freely exchanged in the mar-
ketplace, and hence are even more difficult to quantify. Because the ex-
change of such resources with a spouse adds to the taxpayer's well-being,
they should in theory be taxed as imputed income.5 7 Proposals to do so
have been consistently rejected, however, because of the difficulties of de-
ciding which services to tax, the problem of measuring their value without
unbearable invasions of privacy, and the fact that imputed income does
not produce the actual cash needed to pay tax bills." Since these types of
56. The childcare credit might be viewed as an exception to this rule; however, it was not in-
tended as a deduction for consumption expenses, but rather as a deduction for expenses incurred in
the production of income (that is, paid employment). R. GOODE, supra note 3, at 156. The credit is
available "only if such expenses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed." I.R.C.
§ 44A (c)(2)(A).
57. Imputed services might be recognized as a source of income under a "comprehensive income
tax," a proposed reform that has received much support in recent years. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23,
at 1-3; COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION vii-viii (J. Pechman ed. 1977). Comprehensive income
taxation involves broadening the definition of income and taxing all income alike. The Haig-Simons
definition is the one most favored by specialists; it defines personal income as the market value of
consumption enjoyed during the year plus the net change in savings. Goode, The Economic Definition
of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra, at 7-8; McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of
the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1977). Under
an ideal comprehensive tax system, the imputed income from leisure and services the taxpayer per-
forms for himself would be included in the definition of "market value of consumption" and included
in taxable income. One-earner couples would therefore pay more tax than two-earner couples with
the same income because a nonworking spouse enjoys more free time for leisure and self-performed
services. Id. at 1608. Supporters of comprehensive taxation usually reject the taxation of imputed
income, however, because of the administrative difficulties. See note 58 infra. Use of a comprehensive
tax base might also justify the "double taxation" of cash income transferred from a greater-earning to
a lesser-earning spouse. Some have suggested this treatment for gifts and inheritances, BLUEPRINTS,
supra note 23, at 48; Goode, supra, at 19-20. They argue that the beneficiary must be taxed because
he clearly receives income in the form of greater consumption power, but that the donor should not be
allowed a deduction because making the gift or transfer has presumably provided him satisfaction or
some other element of quid pro quo, and hence is a form of consumption. Id. But see Goode, supra, at
19 (arguing under income pooling theory that family "sharing" should not be regarded as consump-
tion); McIntyre, supra note 1, at 475 n.18 (rejecting double taxation of either shared income or gifts
and inheritances, and recommending that such transfers be taxable to the beneficiary and deductible
by the donor).
58. For a discussion of the difficulties of taxing imputed income, see McIntyre & Oldman, supra
note 57, at 1607-24. Most commentators reject taxation of imputed income as infeasible. See, e.g.,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 7; B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 3, at 84; R. GOODE, supra note
3, at 150-51; H. SIMON, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 53 (1938); Gerzog, supra note 4, at 34.
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services are not usually recognized as sources of income, they should not
be recognized as sources of income when a lesser-earning spouse provides
them in exchange for cash income earned by the greater-earning spouse.
The implications of exchange theory consequently leave little justifica-
tion for joint filing on grounds of horizontal equity, since the well-being of
a married taxpayer depends more upon his personal income and the pat-
tern of exchange he has established with his spouse than on the couple's
joint income. Use of joint filing to deduct consumption expenditures and
tax imputed income only when they result from exchanges between mar-
ried taxpayers is inequitable and arbitrary; horizontal equity is served not
by imposing such treatment on a few taxpayers, but by exempting all
from it." Mandatory separate filing is therefore preferable to joint filing
on equity grounds.
III. Administrative Obstacles to Separate Filing
Although mandatory separate filing provides an attractive solution to
the problems of marriage neutrality and the second earner's disincentive,
and is preferable to joint filing on equity grounds, it presents two serious
administrative problems."' The first is determining the proper treatment
59. Treatment of alimony payments under exchange theory may depend on how such payments
are viewed. If alimony is regarded as an obligation between individuals that is created and enforced by
a third party-the court-alimony payments should be taxable income to the recipient (who clearly
receives control and benefit of the income) and a deductible expense of the payor (whose loss can
hardly be regarded as a voluntary consumption decision). This is the current approach. I.R.C. §§ 71,
215. Alternatively, if alimony is regarded as a means of redressing the spousal exchange inequities
that lead to divorce, see p. 375 supra, it should be treated neither as income to the recipient nor as a
deductible expense of the payor; the transfer would not have received such treatment had it taken
place, as originally intended, within the marriage. The same reasoning applies if the expectation of
alimony in the event of divorce was part of the marital "contract" the spouses implicitly agreed to
before marriage, see p. 374 supra.
It seems more sensible, however, to regard alimony as an obligation created by a third party. Since
alimony is awarded in less than 10% of all divorce cases, see Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Mar-
riage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1186 (1974), it is hardly likely to be an implicit part
of the marital contract. Moreover, since alimony is usually awarded for the lifetime of either spouse or
until remarriage of the recipient, Foster, Alimony Awards, in THE ECONOMIcs OF DIVORCE 7 (Amer-
ican Bar Assoc. 1978), it is difficult to see how it might be characterized as a judicial "balancing" of
existing inequities in interspousal exchange. In jurisdictions that have adopted "no-fault" divorce
laws, however, alimony is sometimes made as an interim and limited award during a transition pe-
riod, and the economic worth of the homemaker's contributions may be considered in determining the
size of the award. Id. at 10-12. In such jurisdictions, judicial balancing of inequitable interspousal
exchange may be an accurate characterization of alimony.
60. A third, more minor problem is avoiding the pre-1948 incentives for common law states to
adopt community property laws in order to receive the benefits of income splitting for their residents
under Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). This problem could readily be overcome by requiring
residents of community property states to attribute earned and unearned income, for federal income
tax purposes, to the spouse that actually earned the income or held title to the property that produced
it. Most experts agree that there is no constitutional obstacle to such legislation. See, e.g., Bittker,
supra note 1, at 1411 n.60; Munnell, supra note 3, at 272-73. But see Hall, The Working Woman
and the Federal Income Tax, 61 A.B.A.J. 716, 717 (1975) (unclear whether federal statute overriding
community property for tax purposes constitutional).
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of interspousal transfers of income-producing property. The second is set-
ting the correct allocation of credits, deductions, and exemptions between
spouses. Neither difficulty, however, poses an insuperable obstacle to
separate filing.61
A. Interspousal Tranfers of Income-Producing Property
If separate filing is readopted, married couples will be able to reduce
their overall tax liabilities by shifting the title to income-producing assets
to the lesser-earning spouse. That income-splitting opportunity does not
exist under joint filing, which attributes unearned income to the couple as
a unit rather than to the spouse holding title to the income-producing
property. Supporters of joint filing have therefore argued that a separate
filing regime would favor couples enjoying significant unearned income
over couples relying principally upon earned income, because only couples
with unearned income could rearrange the title to income-bearing assets
so that each spouse reported an equal amount of income. 62
That criticism of separate filing is premised on the income pooling as-
sumption that a transfer of title between spouses does not affect the actual
benefits received by each spouse. 3 Exchange theory suggests, however,
that such transfers are likely to result in real changes in a spouse's eco-
nomic power."' While a transfer of title between spouses may not result in
61. Political feasibility is a different concern. Under 1979 tax rates, mandatory separate filing
would result in a tax increase for about 60% of married couples, and a tax decrease for the other 40%,
with an overall revenue increase of between $12 and $18 billion. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
supra note 2, at 48. Political opposition might be softened by using this revenue increase to finance an
accross-the-board tax cut of between 7.8% and 5.5%. Id. at 48. The possible political appeal of
mandatory separate filing is evidenced by the fact that H.R. 850, 92d Cong., Ist. Sess., 117 CONG.
REC. 191 (1971), which would have established a single rate schedule for all taxpayers regardless of
marital status, was co-sponsored by 157 members of the House. 1972 Hearings, supra note 3, at 96-
97; Bittker, supra note 1, at 1438; Munnell, supra note 3, at 272. Two similar proposals, H.R. 108,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1054 (1980) (sponsored by Rep. Annunzio) and H.R. 2553,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1054 (1980) (sponsored by Rep. McDonald), were consid-
ered by the 96th Congress. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 48.
62. See, e.g., DIVISION OF TAX RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE TAX TREATMENT
OF THE FAMILY, reprinted in Hearings on Community Property and Family Partnerships Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2, at 849, 850 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME]; Bittker, supra note I, at 1440-41; Oldman & Temple,
supra note 11, at 600-01; Surrey, supra note 13, at 983-84.
63. TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME, supra note 62, at 867 (inequity argument presumes
that original owner may retain control over asset and income by virtue of personal relationship with
new owner); Rosen, supra note 1, at 425 (fear of inequity implicitly presumes that property rights
irrelevant within family); Surrey, supra note 13, at 985 (inequity perception premised on assumption
that family is economic unit of consumption).
64. While one spouse may transfer assets to the other, perhaps in exchange for some other re-
source or service, under exchange theory the donee spouse can generally be expected to be aware that
title and legal control have changed, and to use this new economic resource in bargaining. Many of
the interspousal transfers that were a source of concern prior to 1948 were designed to shift invest-
ment income without shifting ownership or control, Bittker, supra note 1, at 1441, which suggests that
most married taxpayers are reluctant to transfer property rights simply for tax avoidance reasons.
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as complete a transfer of the control and benefits of income-producing
property as a transfer of title between parties dealing at arm's length,6 it
is comparable to a gift of income-producing assets to an adult child or
other relative, and it deserves the same tax recognition. 66
Admittedly, recognition of interspousal transfers would probably in-
crease taxpayer attempts to accomplish "sham" transfers 7 designed to re-
duce tax liability without actual transfer of title. Although the tax admin-
istration must already deal with sham transfers between parents, children,
and other household members, the adoption of separate filing would add
the burden of policing interspousal transfers as well."8 But any alternate
arbitrary rule of allocation, such as attribution of all the couple's
unearned income to the spouse with the greatest earned income, or alloca-
tion between spouses in proportion to earned incomes or on a fifty-fifty
basis, might result in changes in a couple's tax burden upon marriage. 9
In the absence of evidence suggesting that the cost of policing interspousal
transfers would greatly exceed the cost of policing other interfamilial
With recent increases in the divorce rate, see Munnell, supra note 3, at 265-66 (divorce rates more
than doubled between 1966 and 1978, from 2.5 per 1,000 to 5.1 per 1,000 annually; among younger
taxpayers, estimated that more than one-third of married persons between ages 25 and 35 in 1975
will end first marriage in divorce), married individuals have even greater incentive not to transfer
property rights solely to lessen tax liabilities. Even before the recent increases in divorce, Treasury
studies of 1957 and 1959 tax returns reported that high-income taxpayers did not take full advantage
of property transfers to minimize their federal estate and gift tax liability. Id. at 273 n.37.
65. The economic and psychic costs associated with divorce may induce a donee spouse to adhere
to an implicit interspousal bargain to transfer assets for tax purposes only, although the donee spouse
seems likely to demand at least a portion of the tax benefits that result. It is also possible that a naive
spouse might be unaware of the change in legal rights that accompanies a transfer in title, so that the
donor retains control and benefit of the asset. These factors are present when other interfamilial
transfers are made, however, although perhaps to a lesser degree.
66. Under present law, income from property is generally taxable to whomever holds legal title,
even when the property was received as a gift from a family member. See B. BITTKER & L. STONE,
supra note 3, at 415-500.
67. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (taxpayer gave his son interest coupons
from bond); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (taxpayer created trust but retained control
over income with corpus to revert to taxpayer in five years); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930)
(taxpayer retained power to revoke or modify trust).
68. There appears to be little consensus on how unwieldy a tax system that recognized inter-
spousal transfers would be. Compare JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 47-48 (rec-
ognition desirable for marriage neutrality, but would increase administrative complexity) and Brazer,
supra note 1, at 243 (same) with Rosen, supra note 1, at 428 (recognition probably not too burden-
some). There was similar uncertainty in 1948. Compare Surrey, supra note 13, at 981 (suggesting in
1946 that amount of litigation surrounding sham interspousal transfers had reached "unhealthy"
level) with H. GROVES, supra note 11, at 63 (suggesting that concern for interspousal transfers only
minor motivation for 1948 adoption of joint filing system).
69. Any rule that allocated unearned income between spouses without regard for actual title
would violate marriage neutrality because a couple's tax burden might increase or decrease upon
marriage, depending on which spouse has actual title and the proportions in which each earned other
income. A rule that attributed unearned income from an asset to the spouse who actually held title to
the asset at the time of marriage, with no recognition of later transfers, would violate marriage neu-
trality by prohibiting recognition of subsequent transactions that would have been recognized if they
had occurred before, or outside of, marriage.
Separate Filing
transfers of assets, the additional administrative burden is probably a
price worth paying to ensure marriage neutrality.0
B. Interspousal Transfers of Credits, Deductions, and Exemptions
Under mandatory separate filing, the allocation of credits, deductions,
and exemptions between spouses will greatly affect tax burdens and the
potential for taxpayer fraud.7' Under a marriage-neutral system of
mandatory separate filing, the spouse who actually incurs an expense
would, ideally, be entitled to the deduction or exemption associated with
it. But many of the expenses for which exemptions and deductions are
allowed, such as those for jointly owned property or the support of chil-
dren, are incurred and paid jointly by both spouses, and keeping records
of such expenditures would be difficult. Moreover, married persons could
arrange fraudulent transfers of some deductions and credits far more eas-
ily than fraudulent transfers of title to income-producing assets.72
Those problems might be best addressed by adopting two different allo-
cation rules for two categories of expenses. Expenses clearly associated
with property or income to which one spouse has title, such as deprecia-
tion deductions for rental property owned by one spouse, present few ad-
ministrative problems and should be attributed to the spouse with title.7"
Other types of exemptions and deductions present greater administrative
and tax avoidance problems, and should be allocated according to an arbi-
trary rule. Examples are deductions and exemptions associated with
jointly held property, such as capital gains exclusions on the sale of a
residence; expenses that arise out of joint obligations, such as dependent's
exemptions for child support; and expenses that are difficult to trace, such
as personal property casualty losses and charitable contributions. Such ex-
penses could be allocated entirely to the greater- or lesser-earning spouse,
on a fifty-fifty basis, or in proportion to the income reported by each
spouse. 4
70. If the administrative problems proved too great for the tax administration after the adoption of
separate filing, an arbitrary rule, could be adopted. One commentator has suggested that, as unearned
income accounts for only 10% of total adjusted gross income, adopting an arbitrary rule would not be
a serious deviation from marriage neutrality for most taxpayers. Munnell, supra note 3, at 274.
71. Deductions were itemized on 26% of all tax returns in 1977. Munnell, supra note 3, at 277
n.42. Even those taxpayers who do not itemize are entitled to claim dependents' exemptions and the
childcare credit. The proper allocation of deductions and exemptions thus might have a much broader
impact on tapxayers than the allocation of unearned income.
72. The question of allocating deductions, credits, and exemptions also arises under present law
when married taxpayers file separately. Because only about 1.3% of all married couples file sepa-
rately, however, few controversies have arisen. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 38,
48.
73. This category would include capital loss deductions, capital gain exclusions on the sale of a
residence, and investment credits.
74. As allocation entirely to the lesser- or greater-earning spouse inevitably recreates a marriage
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Conclusion
Despite its undesirable effects, joint filing has been retained because of
the belief that, as a matter of horizontal equity, married couples with the
same aggregate incomes should pay the same tax. Studies of marital be-
havior suggest that the income-pooling premise at the heart of this equity
principle is invalid, and there is no compelling justification for the contin-
ued sacrifice of marriage neutrality and the failure to eliminate the second
earner's disincentive. Congress therefore should adopt mandatory separate
filing and return to the individual as the appropriate taxable unit.
bonus or penalty whenever the relevant expenses were not incurred by that spouse, a fifty-fifty or pro-
rata rule might be preferable. While these rules might also violate marriage neutrality, they would do
so in a less predictable fashion; the marriage penalty or bonus would vary from year to year depend-
ing on the proportions in which each spouse earned income and actually incurred deductible expenses.
Such rules are therefore less likely to create clearly perceived incentives or disincentives for marriage.
Whatever rule is adopted would have to require that if one spouse itemizes, the other must do so as
well, to prevent all itemized deductions from being reported on the return of one spouse while the
other takes advantage of the zero bracket amount. If one spouse earns insufficient income to file a
separate return, the other might be granted an additional dependent's exemption.
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